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1. The Accessibility of Justiﬁcation
One dimension of the debate between internalism and externalism in
epistemology concerns the nature and extent of one’s epistemic access
to facts about justiﬁcation. For current purposes, internalism can be
roughly stated as the view that one always has a special kind of episte-
mic access to facts about which propositions one has justiﬁcation to
believe, whereas externalism is the denial of internalism. Many internal-
ists regard the accessibility of justiﬁcation as such an essential part of
its nature that denying it is tantamount to changing the subject. On
this view, nothing deserves the name ‘justiﬁcation’ unless it is accessible
in the relevant way. But what exactly does it mean to say that justiﬁca-
tion is accessible? And why should anyone suppose that justiﬁcation is
accessible?
My aim in this paper is to argue that facts about which propositions
one has justiﬁcation to believe are accessible in the following sense:
The Accessibility Thesis:
• Positive: one has justiﬁcation to believe that p iﬀ one has justiﬁ-
cation to believe that one has justiﬁcation to believe that p (Jp
M JJp).
• Negative: one lacks justiﬁcation to believe that p iﬀ one has jus-
tiﬁcation to believe that one lacks justiﬁcation to believe that p
(Jp M JJp).
The accessibility thesis consists of two biconditionals—positive and
negative—each of which comprises a self-intimation thesis and an infal-
libility thesis:
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The Self-Intimation Thesis:
• Positive: if one has justiﬁcation to believe that p, then one has
justiﬁcation to believe that one has justiﬁcation to believe that p
(Jp ﬁ JJp).
• Negative: if one lacks justiﬁcation to believe that p, then one
has justiﬁcation to believe that one lacks justiﬁcation to believe
that p (Jp ﬁ JJp).
The Infallibility Thesis:
• Positive: if one has justiﬁcation to believe that one has justiﬁca-
tion to believe that p, then one has justiﬁcation to believe that p
(JJp ﬁ Jp).
• Negative: if one has justiﬁcation to believe that one lacks justiﬁ-
cation to believe that p, then one lacks justiﬁcation to believe
that p (JJp ﬁ Jp).
The facts about which propositions one has justiﬁcation to believe
are self-intimating in the sense that if they obtain, then one has
meta-level justiﬁcation to believe that they obtain. Moreover, one’s
meta-level justiﬁcation is infallible in the sense that if one has meta-
level justiﬁcation to believe that those facts obtain, then they do in fact
obtain. So, whether or not one has justiﬁcation to believe a proposi-
tion, one always has meta-level justiﬁcation to form a belief on the
matter, since the facts in question are self-intimating. Moreover, which-
ever belief one has meta-level justiﬁcation to form, it is guaranteed to
be true, since one’s meta-justiﬁcation is infallible. In that sense, one
always has epistemic access to the facts about whether or not one has
justiﬁcation to believe any given proposition.1
The concept of justiﬁcation that ﬁgures in the accessibility thesis
cannot be deﬁned in more basic terms, but it can be elucidated in terms
of related notions, such as reasons and rationality. To say that one has
justiﬁcation to believe a proposition is to say that it is rational or rea-
sonable for one to believe it, which is a matter that depends in turn on
the strength of one’s reasons to believe it. It is reasonable for one to
believe a proposition if and only if one has reasons to believe it, which
1 Williamson (2000: Ch.4) argues that no conditions are luminous in the sense that
one is in a position to know that they obtain if and only if they obtain. See Smithies
(forthcoming, a) for discussion of Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument and its
bearing on the accessibility thesis defended here.
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are not outweighed or defeated by stronger reasons not to believe it,
but to disbelieve it or to withhold belief instead. So, to say that one
has justiﬁcation to believe a proposition is to say that, all things con-
sidered, belief is the most reasonable doxastic attitude for one to adopt
towards the proposition in question.2
For the purposes of this paper, I will operate with the tripartite dis-
tinction between doxastic attitudes of belief, disbelief and withholding
belief. To a ﬁrst approximation, believing a proposition is a disposition
to judge that it is true, while disbelieving a proposition is a disposition
to judge that it is false, and withholding belief in a proposition is a dis-
position to judge that it is an open question whether it is true or false.
Thus, withholding belief in a proposition is not merely the absence of
a doxastic attitude towards a proposition, but is rather a sui generis
attitude of open-mindedness with respect to the truth-value of the
proposition in question.
I will assume that justiﬁcation is exhaustive in the sense that, for any
proposition, one has justiﬁcation either to believe, to disbelieve, or to
withhold belief in that proposition. I will also assume that justiﬁcation
is exclusive in the sense that if one has justiﬁcation to adopt one of
these doxastic attitudes towards a proposition, then one does not have
justiﬁcation to adopt any of the other doxastic attitudes towards the
same proposition. Exhaustiveness and exclusiveness entail uniqueness,
which is the thesis that, for any proposition, there is a unique doxastic
attitude—that is, either belief, disbelief, or withholding—such that one
has justiﬁcation to adopt that attitude towards the proposition in
question.3
The overall plan for the paper is as follows. In section two, I
respond to some standard objections to the accessibility thesis by argu-
ing that it should be formulated as an epistemic thesis, rather than a
doxastic thesis. In section three, I argue that the accessibility of justiﬁ-
cation solves an epistemic version of Moore’s paradox and in section
four, I argue more ambitiously that this epistemic version of Moore’s
paradox cannot be solved except by appeal to the accessibility of justiﬁ-
cation. In section ﬁve, I use this epistemic version of Moore’s paradox
to vindicate the intuitions prompted by BonJour’s (1985) clairvoyance
cases and to challenge Goldman’s (1986) reliabilist treatment of these
2 This is a threshold notion of justiﬁcation, rather than a graded notion. I hope
to discuss analogues of the accessibility thesis for graded notions of justiﬁcation
elsewhere.
3 White (2005) argues for a version of the uniqueness thesis that is formulated
in terms of subjective probabilities, while Feldman (2007) defends a version that is
formulated in terms of the tripartite distinction between belief, disbelief and
withholding.
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cases. I conclude in section six by considering how the accessibility of
justiﬁcation might be explained and how it imposes substantial con-
straints on a theory of the determinants of justiﬁcation.
2. Epistemic and Doxastic Accessibility
As I have formulated it, the accessibility thesis is not a doxastic thesis
about which of one’s beliefs are justiﬁed, but is rather an epistemic the-
sis about which propositions one has justiﬁcation to believe.4 Justiﬁed
belief requires not only having justiﬁcation to believe a proposition, but
also using it in believing that proposition on the basis of one’s justiﬁca-
tion to believe it. By contrast, having justiﬁcation to believe a proposi-
tion does not require using it in forming a justiﬁed belief. As we shall
see, this distinction between epistemic and doxastic versions of the
accessibility thesis is crucial for avoiding the problems of over-intellec-
tualization and vicious regress.
On the epistemic version of the accessibility thesis, one has justiﬁca-
tion to believe a proposition if and only if one has meta-level justiﬁca-
tion to believe that one does. On the doxastic version, by contrast,
one’s belief is justiﬁed if and only if it is held on the basis of an appro-
priate meta-level justiﬁcation. For instance, one of the key premises of
Laurence BonJour’s (1985: Ch.2) argument against foundationalism is
that a belief B is justiﬁed if and only if it is held on the basis of a
meta-justiﬁcatory argument of the following form:
(1) B has feature u.
(2) Beliefs having feature u are highly likely to be true.
(3) Therefore, B is highly likely to be true.
According to BonJour, ‘‘it is necessary, not merely that a justiﬁca-
tion along the above lines exist in the abstract, but also that [the sub-
ject] himself be in cognitive possession of that justiﬁcation, that is, that
he believe the appropriate premises of forms (1) and (2) and that these
beliefs be justiﬁed for him.’’ (1985: 31)
The doxastic accessibility thesis faces an over-intellectualization
objection, since it implies that one has justiﬁed beliefs only if one has
psychological and epistemic concepts and the capacity to use them in
meta-justiﬁcatory reasoning. Moreover, it is subject to a regress
4 Following Firth (1978), this distinction is usually drawn using the terminology of
propositional versus doxastic justiﬁcation, but see also Goldman’s (1979) distinction
between ex ante and ex post justiﬁcation, which is discussed below.
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objection, since it implies that one has justiﬁed beliefs only if one has
an inﬁnite hierarchy of increasingly complicated meta-justiﬁed beliefs.5
However, these objections can be avoided if we formulate the accessi-
bility thesis in epistemic, rather than doxastic, terms. The epistemic ver-
sion implies that one has justiﬁcation to believe a proposition only if
one has an appropriate meta-justiﬁcation—indeed, an inﬁnite regress of
meta-justiﬁcations—but it does not imply that one’s justiﬁed beliefs are
based on these meta-justiﬁcations or even that one has the doxastic
capacities, including conceptual capacities, required to base one’s
beliefs in this way. It therefore avoids the over-intellectualization objec-
tion and it generates an inﬁnite regress of meta-justiﬁcations that is not
vicious, but benign.
It may be objected that while having justiﬁcation to believe a propo-
sition does not require using it, it does at least require having the
capacity to use it in forming a justiﬁed belief. If so, then the epistemic
version of the accessibility thesis implies that one has justiﬁcation to
believe a proposition only if one has the capacity to believe an inﬁnite
hierarchy of increasingly complicated meta-justiﬁcatory propositions,
which has obvious skeptical consequences. However, I will argue that
there is in fact no compelling basis for the assumption that the limits
on one’s doxastic capacities impose corresponding limits on which
propositions one has justiﬁcation to believe. Compare Richard
Feldman and Earl Conee, who write:
There is no basis for the premise that what is epistemically justiﬁed
must be restricted to feasible doxastic alternatives…. Suppose that
there were occasions when forming the attitude that best ﬁts a per-
son’s evidence was beyond normal cognitive limits. This would still be
the attitude justiﬁed by the person’s evidence. If the person had nor-
mal abilities, then he would be in the unfortunate position of being
unable to do what is justiﬁed. (1985: 19)
In my view, there are no doxastic limits on which propositions one has
justiﬁcation to believe, but only which justiﬁed beliefs one has a capac-
ity to form.
Why might one suppose that there are doxastic limits on which
propositions one has justiﬁcation to believe? Some epistemologists
simply deﬁne having justiﬁcation in terms of the capacity to use it:
thus, one has justiﬁcation to believe a proposition if and only if one
5 Bergmann (2006: Ch.1) provides a detailed presentation of the regress argument
against internalism, although he formulates the internalist access requirement in
terms of the notion of ‘‘awareness’’ and does not consider the formulation in terms
of propositional justiﬁcation proposed here. See Smithies (forthcoming, b) for a
more detailed discussion of Bergmann’s argument.
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has a capacity to use it in forming a justiﬁed belief. For instance,
consider Alvin Goldman’s deﬁnition of the distinction between ex ante
and ex post justiﬁcation:
Person S is ex ante justiﬁed in believing p at t if and only if there is a
reliable belief-forming operation available to S which is such that if S
applied that operation to his total cognitive state at t, S would believe
p at t-plus-delta (for a suitably small delta) and that belief would be
ex post justiﬁed. (1979: 21)
An immediate consequence of this deﬁnition is that limits on one’s
doxastic capacities impose corresponding limits on which propositions
one has justiﬁcation to believe. Arguably, however, this reverses the
correct direction of explanation: one has a capacity to form a justiﬁed
belief if and only if one has justiﬁcation to believe the proposition in
question and, in addition, one has the doxastic capacities required to
use one’s justiﬁcation in forming a justiﬁed belief. This leaves it open
whether or not one always has the doxastic capacities required for
using one’s justiﬁcation to believe a proposition. Moreover, this is not
a question that should be closed by deﬁnition.
Perhaps the most inﬂuential line of argument for doxastic limits
appeals to a deontological conception of justiﬁcation as a source of
epistemic obligations, which are binding only insofar as one has the
psychological capacities required to discharge them.6 The argument
proceeds roughly as follows:
(1) If one has justiﬁcation to believe a proposition, then one ought
to believe it on the basis of one’s justiﬁcation.
(2) If one ought to believe a proposition on the basis of one’s jus-
tiﬁcation, then one can believe it on the basis of one’s justiﬁca-
tion.
(3) So, if one has justiﬁcation to believe a proposition, then one
can believe it on the basis of one’s justiﬁcation.
However, the conclusion of this argument is subject to well known
counterexamples in which drugs, brainwashing or mental illness destroy
6 Christensen (2004: Ch. 6) discusses this argument in the context of a useful discus-
sion of the role of idealization in probabilistic models of rationality. See Alston
(1988) for a related line of argument that the deontological conception of justiﬁca-
tion implies that one has voluntary control over one’s beliefs.
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one’s doxastic capacity to believe what one has justiﬁcation to believe.7
In such a case, one’s doxastic limitations excuse one from blame for
one’s epistemic failings, but blamelessness is not suﬃcient for justiﬁca-
tion. It is certainly plausible that there are doxastic limits on blamewor-
thiness, but it does not follow that there are any corresponding
doxastic limits on which propositions one has justiﬁcation to believe.
What are the options for responding to this argument? One option
is to deny the second premise by arguing that ‘ought’ does not always
imply ‘can’. Thus, Richard Feldman (2000) argues that there are so-
called ‘role oughts’ which apply to anyone who plays a certain role,
regardless of how well they are capable of playing that role—thus,
chefs ought to make delicious food and jugglers ought to keep their
balls in the air. Similarly, Feldman argues, there are epistemic ‘oughts’
that apply to us in virtue of our role as believers: ‘‘It is our plight to
be believers. We ought to do it right. It doesn’t matter that in some
cases we are unable to do so.’’ (2000: 676)
Another option is to deny the ﬁrst premise of the argument by
rejecting the deontological conception of justiﬁcation in favour of an
evaluative conception. Thus, William Alston (1985) argues that justiﬁ-
cation is a source of epistemic values or evaluative ideals, rather than
obligations. Deciding between these options depends on how we under-
stand the relationship between values and obligations. Are we obliged
to achieve evaluative ideals or merely to approximate them as closely
as we can? There may be an attenuated sense in which we ought to
achieve ideals regardless of whether we are capable of doing so.8 But
there seems to be a more robust sense, which is more closely connected
to assessments of praise and blame, in which we are obliged merely to
approximate towards ideals to the extent that we are capable of doing
so.9 In this sense, epistemic obligations can be reconstructed from epi-
stemic ideals together with further assumptions about the nature and
extent of our contingent psychological limitations.
If justiﬁcation is a source of evaluative ideals, then there is no reason
to assume that there are doxastic limits on which propositions one has
justiﬁcation to believe. On this view, which propositions one has
justiﬁcation to believe corresponds to an evaluative ideal, which
abstracts away from contingent facts about the limits on one’s doxastic
7 Related examples are discussed by Feldman and Conee (1985: 17), Alston (1985:
67–8), Pryor (2001: 114–5) and Christensen (2004: 161–2).
8 Thus, Feldman and Conee claim: ‘‘In any case of a standard for conduct … it is
appropriate to speak of ‘requirements’ or ‘obligations’ that the standard imposes.’’
(1985: 19)
9 Pryor (2001: 115, fn. 36) draws a related distinction between thick and thin notions
of ‘obligation’.
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capacities. Roughly, the propositions that one has justiﬁcation to
believe are just those propositions that one would believe if one were
to be idealized in relevant respects. However, ideals need not be
humanly attainable. Epistemic ideals—like ideals of morality, scientiﬁc
understanding, and chess—may lie beyond our limited human capaci-
ties. Therefore, the limits on one’s doxastic capacities do not constrain
the epistemic ideal, but only the extent to which one is capable of
approximating towards the ideal. As David Christensen (2004: 162)
puts the point, ‘‘Not all evaluation need be circumscribed by the abili-
ties of the evaluated. In epistemology, as in various other arenas, we
need not grade on eﬀort.’’
One might object that this idealized conception of justiﬁcation loses
touch with our ordinary practices of epistemic evaluation. To illustrate,
Frege’s belief in Axiom V was justiﬁed by ordinary standards, but it was
not ideally justiﬁed, since it was not suited to survive ideal critical reﬂec-
tion on the set-theoretical paradoxes later discovered by Russell. And
yet we can recognize the distinction between ordinary and idealized con-
ceptions of justiﬁcation while maintaining that there is nevertheless an
explanatory connection between them. Being justiﬁed by ordinary stan-
dards is a matter of meeting some contextually determined threshold on
a scale that is deﬁned by reference to the ideal—in other words, it is a
matter of approximating towards the ideal to a sufﬁciently high degree.
On this view, we can reconstruct everyday notions of justiﬁcation by ref-
erence to an idealized notion of justiﬁcation that abstracts away from
our contingent psychological limitations together with further assump-
tions about the nature and extent of those limitations.
So far, I have articulated an epistemic version of the accessibility
thesis and I have defended it against some preliminary objections, but I
have not yet given any positive arguments in its favour. In the remain-
ing sections of this paper, I will argue for the accessibility of justiﬁca-
tion on the grounds that anyone who denies it is thereby faced with an
epistemic version of Moore’s paradox.
3. Moore’s Paradox
As G. E. Moore famously noticed, there is something interestingly
defective involved in asserting conjunctions of the following forms:
(1) p and I do not believe that p.
(2) I believe that p and it is not the case that p.
280 DECLAN SMITHIES
The American journalist, H. L. Mencken, gives an amusing example:
‘‘All men are frauds. The only difference between them is that some
admit it. I myself deny it.’’ There is something manifestly fraudulent
about a man who asserts that all men are frauds and then proceeds to
assert that he denies it. Indeed, he comes dangerously close to con-
tradicting himself, but like any good fraud, he is hard to pin down.
What he asserts is not a contradiction of the form, ‘p and it is not the
case that p,’ but something closer to a Moorean conjunction of the
form, ‘p and I believe that it is not the case that p.’
What exactly is wrong with asserting Moorean conjunctions? On the
one hand, asserting Moorean conjunctions seems absurd or self-defeat-
ing in much the same way as asserting contradictions. On the other
hand, Moorean conjunctions are not contradictions. Given that I am
neither omniscient nor infallible, it is quite possible that I do not
believe that p when p is true or that I believe that p when p is false.
Moorean conjunctions can be true, but they cannot be asserted without
absurdity. The problem of explaining why this is so has come to be
known as Moore’s paradox.10
As Sydney Shoemaker (1996) observes, a solution to Moore’s para-
dox should explain why believing a Moorean conjunction is just as bad
as asserting it. The absurdity is much the same whether or not one’s
belief is given linguistic expression through the speech act of assertion.
Since Moore’s paradox is not a purely linguistic phenomenon, it cannot
be solved by appealing to purely linguistic norms, such as Gricean
norms of conversational implicature. A more promising strategy is to
appeal to more fundamental epistemic norms governing belief together
with derivative norms linking assertion and belief. If we can explain
what is wrong with believing Moorean conjunctions, then we can
explain what is wrong with asserting Moorean conjunctions by invok-
ing Shoemaker’s principle, which states: ‘‘What can be (coherently)
believed constrains what can be (coherently) asserted.’’ (1996: 76)
A plausible account of Moorean absurdity emerges once we shift
our focus from assertion to belief. Intuitively, believing Moorean con-
junctions is irrational. Moreover, the irrationality of believing Moorean
conjunctions does not derive from believing one conjunct or the other,
but from the conﬂict between believing both conjuncts simultaneously.
It is irrational to believe that p while disbelieving that one believes that
p and it is irrational to believe that one believes that p while disbeliev-
ing that p. Indeed, we can take this one step further: it is irrational to
believe that p while withholding belief that one believes that p or to
10 See the introduction to Green and Williams (2007) for a history and overview of
Moore’s paradox.
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believe that one believes that p while withholding belief that p.11 This
form of irrationality is harder to convey by means of a Moorean con-
junction, since there is no speech act that naturally functions to express
withholding in the way that assertion functions to express belief. But if
an assertion of the form, ‘It is an open question whether p,’ can be
used to express withholding, then we can add the following Moorean
conjunctions:
(3) p and it is an open question whether I believe that p.
(4) I believe that p and it is an open question whether p.
Any solution to Moore’s paradox should explain why (3) and (4) are
defective in much the same way as (1) and (2) above.
To sum up, believing a proposition rationally commits one to believ-
ing that one believes it and believing that one believes a proposition
rationally commits one to believing it. In other words, it is irrational to
believe either (i) the proposition that p or (ii) the proposition that one
believes that p, while disbelieving or withholding belief in the other.
This leads Shoemaker to conclude that if one is fully rational, then one
believes that p if and only if one believes that one believes that p. Thus,
he writes: ‘‘in a rational person belief that p brings with it belief that
one believes that p’’ and conversely, ‘‘a rational person who believes
that she believes that p thereby believes that p.’’ (1995: 225–6)
Moore noticed that there are epistemic counterparts of (1) and (2),
which are formulated in terms of knowledge, rather than belief:
(5) p and I do not know that p.
(6) I know that p and it is not the case that p.
Timothy Williamson (2000: Ch.11) has argued that the epistemic ver-
sion of Moore’s paradox is explained by the knowledge rule, which
governs the permissibility of assertion, and its inner analogue, belief:
• The knowledge rule: ‘‘One must: assert [or believe] p only if one
knows p.’’ (2000: 243)
Williamson argues that one cannot know either (5) or (6) and so, by
the knowledge rule, one must not believe or assert them. The argument
11 Versions of this point are made by Shoemaker (1995: 215) and Chalmers and
Ha´jek (2007: 171).
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relies on the premise that one knows a conjunction only if one knows
each of its conjuncts. If one knows the ﬁrst conjunct of (5), then its sec-
ond conjunct is false and so one cannot know it, since knowledge is
factive. Similarly, if one knows the second conjunct of (6), then its ﬁrst
conjunct is false and so one cannot know it, since knowledge is factive.
However, the knowledge rule fails to explain what is wrong with believ-
ing or asserting epistemic counterparts of (3) and (4):
(7) p and it is an open question whether I know that p.
(8) I know that p and it is an open question whether p.
And yet any adequate solution to the epistemic version of Moore’s
paradox should explain why (7) and (8) are defective in much the same
way as (5) and (6) above.12
As before, the irrationality of believing these Moorean conjunctions
stems from the conﬂict between believing both conjuncts simulta-
neously. It is irrational to believe either (i) the proposition that p, or
(ii) the proposition that one knows that p, while disbelieving or with-
holding belief in the other. Thus, we might extend Shoemaker’s conclu-
sion by claiming that if one is fully rational, then one believes that p if
and only if one believes that one knows that p. In other words, believ-
ing a proposition rationally commits one to believing that one knows
it, and vice versa. As Michael Huemer writes, ‘‘If one believes that p,
one is thereby rationally committed to taking one’s belief to be knowl-
edge.’’ (2007: 145)
The Moorean conjunctions we have considered so far can be refor-
mulated in terms of justiﬁcation, rather than knowledge or belief:
(9) p and I do not have justiﬁcation to believe that p.
(10) I have justiﬁcation to believe that p and it is not the case
that p.
(11) p and it is an open question whether or not I have justiﬁca-
tion to believe that p.
(12) I have justiﬁcation to believe that p and it is an open question
whether or not p.
12 Sosa (2007: 115–6) makes related points in his discussion of the problem of the
criterion.
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These conjunctions are defective in much the same way as those
already considered. In particular, these conjunctions can hardly be any
more acceptable than those formulated in terms of knowledge, since (5)
– (8) entail (9) – (12) on the assumption that one knows a proposition
only if one has justiﬁcation to believe it.
As before, the irrationality of believing these Moorean conjunctions
stems from the conﬂict between believing both conjuncts simulta-
neously. It is irrational to believe either (i) the proposition that p, or
(ii) the proposition that one has justiﬁcation to believe that p, while
disbelieving or withholding belief in the other. In other words, believing
a proposition rationally commits one to believing that one has justiﬁca-
tion to believe it and vice versa. In this case, the extended version of
Shoemaker’s conclusion is that if one is fully rational, then one believes
that p if and only if one believes that one has justiﬁcation to believe
that p.
What explains this fact about rationality? If justiﬁcation is accessi-
ble, then we have a ready explanation—namely, that one has justiﬁca-
tion to believe a proposition if and only if one has justiﬁcation to
believe that one does. Given exclusiveness, if one has justiﬁcation to
believe a proposition, then one lacks justiﬁcation either to disbelieve or
to withhold belief in the proposition that one has justiﬁcation to
believe it. By the same token, if one has justiﬁcation to believe that one
has justiﬁcation to believe a proposition, then one lacks justiﬁcation
either to disbelieve it or to withhold belief. So, if the accessibility thesis
is true, then it is always irrational to believe the Moorean conjunctions
above, since one cannot have justiﬁcation to believe each of their con-
juncts simultaneously.13
The accessibility of justiﬁcation therefore provides the resources for
solving an epistemic version of Moore’s paradox. In light of this, one
might argue for the accessibility thesis on the basis of an inference to
the best explanation. The problem with this strategy is that it requires
not only showing that the accessibility thesis explains the data, but also
that it does so better than all of the alternatives. We have already seen
that some explanatory strategies fail because they are insufﬁciently gen-
eral, but I cannot attempt an exhaustive survey here. Instead, my strat-
egy in what follows is to mount a deductive argument that the
accessibility thesis is indispensable for explaining the relevant kind of
13 Here I assume that one has justiﬁcation to believe a conjunction only if one has
justiﬁcation to believe its conjuncts. Moreover I assume that one has justiﬁcation
to disbelieve a proposition iﬀ one has justiﬁcation to believe it is false and to with-
hold belief iﬀ one has justiﬁcation to believe that it is an open question whether it
is true or false.
284 DECLAN SMITHIES
Moorean irrationality and hence that anyone who denies it is unable to
solve the epistemic version of Moore’s paradox.
4. An Argument from Moore’s Paradox
The overall strategy is to argue by reductio. Anyone who denies the
accessibility thesis is thereby committed to the possibility of having jus-
tiﬁcation for certain combinations of doxastic attitudes. However, these
doxastic attitudes are not rationally co-tenable, since they generate a
distinctively Moorean kind of irrationality. Moreover, we cannot
explain this Moorean irrationality on the assumption that one has justi-
ﬁcation for the doxastic attitudes in question. But if we assume that
one cannot have justiﬁcation for doxastic attitudes that are not ratio-
nally co-tenable, then our assumptions yield a contradiction. We
should therefore conclude that the accessibility thesis is true. The argu-
ment can be summarized as follows:
(1) The accessibility thesis is false.
(2) If the accessibility of justiﬁcation is false, then one can have
simultaneous justiﬁcation for certain doxastic attitudes.
(3) These doxastic attitudes are not rationally co-tenable, since
they give rise to an epistemic version of Moore’s paradox.
(4) If these doxastic attitudes are not rationally co-tenable, then
one cannot have simultaneous justiﬁcation for these doxastic
attitudes.
(5) So, the accessibility thesis is true (by reductio).
The accessibility thesis comprises four conditionals—namely, positive
and negative versions of self-intimation and infallibility—so, in order
to ﬂesh out this argument, we should consider how the argument
applies to each conditional in turn.
1. Negative Infallibility (JJp ﬁ Jp)
If negative infallibility is false, then there is a possible case in which
one has justiﬁcation to believe that one lacks justiﬁcation to believe
that p, although one has justiﬁcation to believe that p. However, it is
irrational to believe that p, while also believing that one lacks justiﬁca-
tion to believe that p, since this is to be committed to the Moorean
conjunction:
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• p and I do not have justiﬁcation to believe that p.
2. Positive Self-Intimation (Jp ﬁ JJp)
If positive self-intimation is false, then there is a possible case in which
one has justiﬁcation to believe that p, although one lacks justiﬁcation
to believe that one has justiﬁcation to believe that p. By exhaustiveness,
it follows that one has justiﬁcation either to disbelieve or to withhold
belief in the proposition that one has justiﬁcation to believe that p.
However, it is irrational to believe that p while disbelieving or with-
holding belief that one has justiﬁcation to believe that p, since this is to
be committed to one of the following pair of Moorean conjunctions:
• p and I do not have justiﬁcation to believe that p.
• p and it is an open question whether I have justiﬁcation to
believe that p.
3. Positive Infallibility (JJp ﬁ Jp)
If positive infallibility is false, then there is a possible case in which one
has justiﬁcation to believe that one has justiﬁcation to believe that p,
although one lacks justiﬁcation to believe that p. By exhaustiveness, it
follows that one has justiﬁcation to disbelieve or to withhold belief that
p. However, it is irrational to believe that one has justiﬁcation to believe
that p, while disbelieving or withholding belief that p, since this is to be
committed to one of the following pair of Moorean conjunctions:
• I have justiﬁcation to believe that p and it is not the case that p.
• I have justiﬁcation to believe that p and it is an open question
whether p.
4. Negative Self-Intimation (Jp ﬁ JJp)
If negative self-intimation is false, then there is a possible case in which
one lacks justiﬁcation to believe that p, although one lacks justiﬁcation
to believe that one does. By exhaustiveness, it follows that one has jus-
tiﬁcation to disbelieve or to withhold belief that p and also that one
has justiﬁcation to believe or to withhold belief that one lacks justiﬁca-
tion to believe that p. However, it is irrational to disbelieve or withhold
belief that p while also disbelieving or withholding belief that one has
justiﬁcation to disbelieve or withhold belief that p, since this is to be
committed to one of the following Moorean conjunctions:
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• I have justiﬁcation to believe that p and it is not the case that p.
• I have justiﬁcation to believe that p and it is an open question
whether p.
• It is an open question whether I have justiﬁcation to believe
that p and it is not the case that p.
• It is an open question whether I have justiﬁcation to believe
that p and it is an open question whether p.
All of these Moorean conjunctions were encountered in the previous
section except the very last pair. However, these are no more accept-
able than the others. Just as it seems irrational to believe a proposition
while withholding on whether one has justiﬁcation to believe it, so it
seems irrational to disbelieve a proposition while withholding on
whether one has justiﬁcation to disbelieve it or to withhold on a propo-
sition while withholding on whether one has justiﬁcation to withhold.
Each of these combinations of doxastic attitudes involves a similar kind
of rational instability.
What are the options for responding to this argument? Since its pre-
mises entail a contradiction, the only question is which premise should
be rejected. I claim that we should reject the ﬁrst premise, but why not
reject another premise instead?
The only option for denying the second premise is to deny exhaus-
tiveness, which states that, for any proposition, one has justiﬁcation
either to believe it, to disbelieve it, or to withhold belief. But I maintain
that one cannot have justiﬁcation to adopt any doxastic attitude
towards a proposition without having justiﬁcation to adopt one of
these. After all, these are coarse-grained doxastic attitudes, which are
multiply realized by more ﬁne-grained doxastic attitudes, so it is plausi-
ble that any distribution of credence realizes at least one of these
coarse-grained attitudes.14 Following Gilbert Harman (1986), one might
argue that one has pragmatic justiﬁcation to avoid cluttering up one’s
mind by not adopting any doxastic attitude at all towards certain prop-
ositions. However, even if this is true, it does not follow that one lacks
epistemic justiﬁcation to adopt some doxastic attitude towards every
proposition in the sense that there is a fact of the matter about which
14 For instance, withholding is consistent with many diﬀerent ways of distributing
one’s credence, including a sharp credence of 0.5 or a fuzzy credence that is spread
out between the interval between 0 and 1. Similar points apply to believing and dis-
believing.
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of these doxastic attitudes is the most epistemically reasonable one to
adopt.
To deny the third premise is to deny that there is any irrationality
involved in believing or asserting the Moorean conjunctions in ques-
tion. However, this is not easy to swallow. How can it be rational to
believe a proposition while disbelieving or withholding belief in the
proposition that one has justiﬁcation to believe it? One might claim, in
a Wittgensteinian spirit, that not all beliefs stand in need of justiﬁca-
tion, such as basic beliefs in the law of non-contradiction and the uni-
formity of nature. Presumably, however, these beliefs are not
unreasonable. Recall my stipulation that what it means to say one has
justiﬁcation to believe a proposition is just to say that it is reasonable
or rational for one to believe it. By deﬁnition, then, it is unreasonable
to believe a proposition unless one has justiﬁcation to believe it. A
more plausible Wittgensteinian position is that some basic beliefs are
justiﬁed by default, which stands in contrast to the claim that they are
not justiﬁed at all.15
To deny the fourth premise is to claim that sometimes one has justi-
ﬁcation to adopt a combination of doxastic attitudes, which are not
rationally co-tenable. But if one has justiﬁcation to adopt the doxastic
attitudes in question, then what explains why they are not rationally
co-tenable? The most promising strategy here is to invoke defeaters:
perhaps one has justiﬁcation to adopt certain doxastic attitudes,
although one’s justiﬁcation is defeated in the very act of forming the
attitudes in question.16
By way of illustration, let us consider a case in which one has justiﬁ-
cation to believe a Moorean conjunction owing to recognition of one’s
own irrationality. Suppose that one has justiﬁcation to believe that
one’s team will lose the game, while recognizing that one cannot quite
bring oneself to believe this. In that case, one has justiﬁcation to
believe the Moorean conjunction: my team will lose and I do not
believe that my team will lose. However, one cannot justiﬁably believe
this Moorean conjunction, since if one believes the ﬁrst conjunct, then
one’s justiﬁcation to believe the second conjunct is thereby defeated.
Hence, one’s justiﬁcation to believe the Moorean conjunction is ‘‘ﬁn-
kish’’ in the sense that it is defeated in the very act of forming the
belief in question.17
15 Wright (2004) develops a position of this kind, although he uses the terminology of
‘entitlement’ rather than ‘justiﬁcation’ to mark out warrants that are had by
default.
16 Many thanks to Ralph Wedgwood for urging me to consider this strategy.
17 The allusion is to Martin’s (1994) ﬁnkish dispositions, which are destroyed when-
ever their manifestation conditions obtain.
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Opponents of the accessibility thesis might try to exploit this
loophole in explaining Moorean irrationality, while avoiding any
commitment to the accessibility thesis. On this view, one may have
justiﬁcation to believe a proposition, while also having justiﬁcation
to disbelieve or to withhold belief in the proposition that one has
justiﬁcation to believe it. However, one’s justiﬁcation for this combi-
nation of doxastic attitudes is ‘‘ﬁnkish’’ in the sense that if one dis-
believes or withholds belief in the proposition that one has
justiﬁcation to believe the proposition in question, then one’s justiﬁ-
cation to believe it is thereby defeated. If this is correct, then we
can explain why these doxastic attitudes are not rationally co-tenable
while maintaining that one can have justiﬁcation for these attitudes
simultaneously.
Michael Bergmann (2005) invokes defeaters in attempting to explain
away the appeal of higher-level requirements on justiﬁcation. Accord-
ing to Bergmann, it is an analytic truth that a belief b is justiﬁed only
if it has no defeater, since a defeater is deﬁned as any mental state that
causes an otherwise justiﬁed belief to be unjustiﬁed:
• d is a defeater at t for S’s belief b iﬀ (i) d is an experience or
propositional attitude or combination thereof; (ii) S comes to
have d at t; (iii) as a result of S’s coming to have d at t, b ceases
to be justiﬁed. (2005: 422)
Bergmann argues that all believed defeaters are actual defeaters: in
other words, if one believes that one’s belief b is unjustiﬁed, then it is
unjustiﬁed. Moreover, he argues that if one does not believe that b is
unjustiﬁed, but merely withholds belief in the proposition that b is justi-
ﬁed, then one’s belief b is unjustiﬁed. Therefore, if one adopts any dox-
astic attitude other than belief towards the proposition that one’s belief
b is justiﬁed, then b is unjustiﬁed. Nevertheless, he argues that there is
no higher-level requirement for justiﬁcation, since it may be that b is
justiﬁed even if one does not adopt any doxastic attitude at all towards
the proposition that b is justiﬁed.
In response to Bergmann, I think it is crucial to draw a distinction
between propositional and doxastic defeaters. A doxastic defeater is a
mental state that undermines doxastic justiﬁcation—that is, it makes it
the case that one’s beliefs are unjustiﬁed. A propositional defeater, on
the other hand, is a mental state that undermines propositional justiﬁ-
cation—that is, it makes it the case that one does not possess justiﬁca-
tion to believe a proposition. The crucial point is that not all doxastic
defeaters are propositional defeaters: in particular, unjustiﬁed doxastic
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attitudes can function as doxastic defeaters, but not propositional
defeaters.18
To illustrate, suppose that one has a justiﬁed belief that p, but then
one forms unjustiﬁed beliefs that if p, then q, and not-q, while retaining
one’s belief that p. One’s belief that p is now unjustiﬁed, since it is irra-
tionally insensitive to the presence of inconsistent beliefs, but it does
not follow that one lacks all things considered justiﬁcation to believe
that p. After all, the most reasonable course of action would be to
retain one’s belief that p, while abandoning one’s other beliefs. The
presence of unjustiﬁed beliefs can undermine the doxastic justiﬁcation
of one’s belief that p, but it does not thereby defeat one’s propositional
justiﬁcation to believe that p. Analogously, suppose that one has a jus-
tiﬁed belief that p, but then one forms an unjustiﬁed higher-order atti-
tude of disbelieving or withholding belief that one has justiﬁcation to
believe that p. One’s belief that p is now unjustiﬁed, since it is irratio-
nally insensitive to the presence of rationally conﬂicting higher-order
attitudes, but it does not follow that one lacks all things considered jus-
tiﬁcation to believe that p. After all, the most reasonable course of
action would be to retain one’s belief that p, while abandoning one’s
conﬂicting higher-order attitudes. The presence of unjustiﬁed higher-
order attitudes can undermine the doxastic justiﬁcation of one’s belief
that p, but it does not thereby defeat one’s propositional justiﬁcation
to believe that p.
James Pryor (2004) draws a related distinction between which propo-
sitions one has justiﬁcation to believe and which propositions one is
rationally committed to believing by beliefs that one already has.19 If
one’s beliefs are unjustiﬁed, then one may be rationally committed to
believing propositions that one has no justiﬁcation to believe. More-
over, one may have justiﬁcation to believe a proposition, although one
is rationally obstructed from using it in forming a justiﬁed belief, since
one has unjustiﬁed beliefs that rationally commit one to disbelieve or
to withhold belief in that proposition, rather than believing it. In my
18 Bergmann (2006: 159–60) claims that ‘‘there is not much at stake’’ between the
view that what gets defeated are beliefs and the view that what gets defeated are
reasons or justiﬁcations for beliefs. But this overlooks the important fact that the
doxastic justiﬁcation of one’s beliefs can be defeated, while the propositional justiﬁ-
cation for one’s beliefs remains undefeated.
19 As Pryor notes, Broome (1999) draws a distinction between reasons and normative
requirements, which parallels his distinction between justiﬁcation and rational com-
mitments. In Broome’s terms, one is normatively required to believe that q if one
believes that p and if p, then q, but it does not follow that one has any reason to
believe that q. As Broome develops the point, normative requirements take wide
scope and so they don’t detach, i.e. there is no valid argument from O (Bp ﬁ Bq)
and Bp to OBq.
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terminology, that is a case in which one has a doxastic defeater, but no
propositional defeater.
Why isn’t it enough for Bergmann’s purposes to claim that disbeliev-
ing or withholding belief that one has justiﬁcation to believe that p is a
doxastic defeater, but not a propositional defeater? The answer is that
this does not explain why the relevant attitudes are not rationally co-
tenable. All sides agree that it is irrational to believe that p while disbe-
lieving or withholding belief that one has justiﬁcation to believe that p.
In other words, disbelieving or withholding belief in the proposition
that one has justiﬁcation to believe that p rationally commits one to not
believing that p. But what explains the existence of this rational com-
mitment? Why is it that disbelieving or withholding belief in the propo-
sition that one has justiﬁcation to believe that p rationally commits one
to not believing that p?
Following Pryor, I claim that rational commitments are best
explained in terms of more fundamental facts about the structure of
propositional justiﬁcation:
I think we can understand rational commitments like this. Take a
belief the subject happens to have, e.g., his belief in P. Consider what
would be the epistemic effects of his having (decisive) justiﬁcation for
that belief. … If one of the eﬀects is that the subject has decisive justi-
ﬁcation to believe Q, then his belief in P counts as rationally commit-
ting him to the belief in Q—regardless of whether he really does have
any justiﬁcation to believe P. (2004: 364)
For instance, there is a rational commitment to believe that q if one
believes that p and if p, then q: in other words, it is irrational to believe
that p and if p, then q, while disbelieving or withholding belief that q.
What explains this rational commitment is the fact that one has justiﬁ-
cation to believe that q if one has justiﬁcation to believe that p and if
p, then q. Similarly, there is a rational commitment to believe that p if
and only if one believes that one has justiﬁcation to believe that p: in
other words, it is irrational to believe either the proposition that p, or
the proposition that one has justiﬁcation to believe that p, while disbe-
lieving or withholding belief in the other. But what explains this
rational commitment? The answer is that justiﬁcation is accessible in
the sense that one has justiﬁcation to believe that p if and only if one
has justiﬁcation to believe that one does.
On this view, one cannot explain the rational commitments that
are violated in believing Moorean conjunctions without invoking the
accessibility thesis. Hence, there is a challenge for opponents of the
accessibility thesis to give some alternative explanation of the relevant
kind of Moorean irrationality. In the absence of any satisfactory alter-
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native, I draw the provisional conclusion that the accessibility thesis is
indispensable for explaining the Moorean irrationality in question.
5. Reliabilism and Clairvoyance
Having used an epistemic version of Moore’s paradox in arguing for
the accessibility of justiﬁcation, I want now to consider how this bears
on the classic debate between Laurence BonJour (1985) and Alvin
Goldman (1986) over the viability of an externalist version of reliabi-
lism.
Let us begin with strong reliabilism—that is, the view that reliability
is both necessary and suﬃcient for justiﬁcation. A doxastic process is
reliable if and only if it is disposed to yield a suﬃciently high ratio of
true to false beliefs in suﬃciently similar circumstances. According to
strong reliabilism, one’s belief is justiﬁed if and only if it is based on a
reliable doxastic process and, similarly, one has justiﬁcation to believe
a proposition if and only if one is disposed to believe that proposition
on the basis of a reliable doxastic process.
Strong reliabilism is incompatible with the accessibility of justiﬁca-
tion, since one does not always have epistemic access to the reliability
or unreliability of one’s doxastic processes. This point is illustrated by
many of the intuitive counterexamples to strong reliabilism, including
BonJour’s example of the clairvoyant subject, Maud:
Maud believes herself to have the power of clairvoyance, though she
has no reasons for this belief. She maintains her belief despite being
inundated by embarrassed friends and relatives with massive quanti-
ties of apparently cogent scientiﬁc evidence that no such power is pos-
sible. One day Maud comes to believe, for no apparent reason, that
that the President is in New York City, and she maintains this belief
despite the lack of any independent evidence, appealing to her alleged
clairvoyant power. Now in fact the President is in New York City,
and Maud does, under the conditions then satisﬁed, have completely
reliable clairvoyant power. Moreover, her belief about the President
did result from the operation of that power. (1985: 40)
If strong reliabilism is true, then Maud has justiﬁcation to believe that
the President is in New York City on the basis of her reliable clairvoy-
ant power. However, she has scientiﬁc evidence against the possibility
of reliable clairvoyance and so she has justiﬁcation to believe that her
clairvoyant belief is unreliably formed and so lacks justiﬁcation. There-
fore, Maud has justiﬁcation to believe a proposition, while also having
meta-level justiﬁcation to believe that she lacks justiﬁcation to believe
it, which violates the principles of positive self-intimation and negative
infallibility.
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Intuitively, Maud’s clairvoyant beliefs are unjustiﬁed, despite the fact
that they are reliably formed. At any rate, this is BonJour’s intuitive
reaction to the case. But what if one disagrees or simply bites the bul-
let? Is there anything more to be said in defence of this verdict besides
an appeal to the brute deliverances of intuition? At this point, the
resources of this paper can be brought into play. On the one hand, if
we assume that justiﬁcation is accessible, then we can argue from the
premise that Maud has meta-level justiﬁcation to believe that she lacks
justiﬁcation for her clairvoyant beliefs to the conclusion that those
clairvoyant beliefs are unjustiﬁed. On the other hand, if we assume that
justiﬁcation is not accessible, then we are faced with an epistemic ver-
sion of Moore’s paradox. Suppose that Maud has justiﬁcation to
believe that the President is in New York City, although she also has
justiﬁcation to believe that she does not have justiﬁcation to believe
this. In that case, she has justiﬁcation to believe the Moorean conjunc-
tion: the President is in New York City, but I do not have justiﬁcation
to believe that the President is in New York City. Clearly, however, it
is irrational to believe this Moorean conjunction. Therefore, propo-
nents of strong reliabilism who deny the accessibility of justiﬁcation are
faced with an epistemic version of Moore’s paradox.
Alvin Goldman (1986) pursues a diﬀerent approach. Rather than
biting the bullet on BonJour’s example, he accepts BonJour’s verdict
and tries to accommodate it within a reliabilist theory of justiﬁcation.
However, Goldman opts for a weak version of reliabilism on which
reliability is necessary but not suﬃcient for justiﬁcation.20 Goldman’s
proposal is that a belief is justiﬁed if and only if it is reliably formed
and it also satisﬁes a no-undermining condition, which states that a
belief is unjustiﬁed if one believes, or if one has justiﬁcation to believe,
that one lacks justiﬁcation for the belief in question:
Suppose S’s belief in p is permitted by a right J-rule system, but S
believes that it is not so permitted. Alternatively, suppose S’s belief in
p is permitted by a right J-rule system and S is justiﬁed in believing
that it is not so permitted (whether or not he actually believes that it
is not permitted). In either case, it is counterintuitive to regard S’s
belief in p as justiﬁed. In these cases S’s belief, or justiﬁcation for
believing, that the belief is not permitted undermines its permittedness.
That is, although the belief is permitted, this does not intuitively suf-
ﬁce for its justiﬁedness. (1986: 62)
20 Goldman (1986: 113) argues in response to the new evil demon case that justiﬁca-
tion does not require reliability in the actual world, but reliability in normal
worlds, which are worlds that are consistent with our general beliefs about the
actual world. However, this response raises issues that are orthogonal to my
present concerns and so I will leave it aside.
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Goldman’s no-undermining condition entails the negative infallibility
thesis, which states that if one has justiﬁcation to believe that one lacks
justiﬁcation to believe that p, then one lacks justiﬁcation to believe that
p (JJp ﬁ Jp). Moreover, if one accepts the negative infallibility
thesis, then it is also very natural to accept the positive infallibility the-
sis, which states that if one has justiﬁcation to believe that one has jus-
tiﬁcation to believe that p, then one has justiﬁcation to believe that p
(JJp ﬁ Jp). Otherwise, what accounts for the asymmetry? Neverthe-
less, Goldman’s position is distinctively externalist insofar as he rejects
both positive and negative versions of the self-intimation thesis.
Recently, BonJour (2003: 32) has expressed doubts about ‘‘whether
accepting part of the internalist requirement for justiﬁcation while
rejecting the other part does not amount to an untenable halfway
house.’’ In what follows, I will attempt to substantiate these doubts by
explaining why Goldman’s position fails to provide a stable and well
motivated form of externalism.
The motivation for the no-undermining condition is that it generates
the intuitive verdict that Maud’s clairvoyant beliefs are unjustiﬁed.
Since she has justiﬁcation to believe that her clairvoyant beliefs are
unreliable and so unjustiﬁed, this undermines any justiﬁcation that
would otherwise have accrued in virtue of their de facto reliability.
However, this response does not extend to BonJour’s example of the
clairvoyant, Norman, who is unlike Maud in that he does not have jus-
tiﬁcation to believe that his clairvoyant beliefs are either reliable or
unreliable:
Norman, under certain conditions which usually obtain, is a com-
pletely reliable clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of subject
matter. He possesses no evidence or reasons of any kind for or against
the general possibility of such a cognitive power or for or against the
thesis that he possesses it. One day Norman comes to believe that the
President is in New York City, though he has no evidence either for
or against this belief. In fact the belief is true and results from his
clairvoyant power under circumstances in which it is completely reli-
able. (1985: 41)
Norman has no evidence either for or against the hypothesis that he
has a reliable clairvoyant power. So, unlike Maud, he has justiﬁcation
to withhold belief about whether or not he has justiﬁcation for his
clairvoyant beliefs. Nevertheless, there is a strong case to be made that
Norman lacks justiﬁcation for his clairvoyant beliefs. If we assume that
justiﬁcation is accessible, then we can argue from the premise that Nor-
man lacks meta-level justiﬁcation to believe that he has justiﬁcation for
his clairvoyant beliefs to the conclusion that his clairvoyant beliefs are
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unjustiﬁed. And if we assume that justiﬁcation is not accessible, then
we are faced with an epistemic version of Moore’s paradox. Suppose
that Norman has justiﬁcation to believe that the President is in New
York City, although he lacks justiﬁcation to believe that he does. In
that case, he has justiﬁcation to believe the Moorean conjunction: the
President is in New York City, but it is an open question whether I
have justiﬁcation to believe that the President is in New York City.
Clearly, however, it is irrational to believe this Moorean conjunction.
Therefore, if Goldman denies the accessibility of justiﬁcation, then he
is faced with an epistemic version of Moore’s paradox.
Goldman’s response is to dispute BonJour’s description of the case:
BonJour describes this case as one in which Norman possesses no evi-
dence or reasons of any kind for or against the general possibility of
clairvoyance, or for or against the thesis that he possesses it. But it is
hard to envisage this description holding. Norman ought to reason
along the following lines: ‘If I had a clairvoyant power, I would surely
ﬁnd some evidence for this. I would ﬁnd myself believing things in
otherwise inexplicable ways, and when these things were checked by
otherwise reliable processes, they would usually check out positively.
Since I lack any such signs, I apparently do not possess reliable clair-
voyant processes.’ Since Norman ought to reason in this way, he is ex
ante justiﬁed in believing that he does not possess reliable clairvoyant
processes. This undermines his belief… (1986: 112)
On the face of it, Goldman’s strategy seems unpromising. As BonJour
describes the case, Norman’s clairvoyant power is domain speciﬁc in the
sense that it relates only to certain kinds of subject matter, such as the
whereabouts of the President. Presumably, then, we can set up the case
in such a way that the opportunity to use this clairvoyant power has
simply never arisen before. In that case, Norman will not have had any
opportunity to reason along the lines that Goldman proposes, by reﬂect-
ing on the previous operations of his clairvoyant power and checking its
deliverances for coherence with his other beliefs. In other words, we can
stipulate that this is a case of justiﬁed agnosticism, in which Norman has
justiﬁcation to believe that the President is in New York City, although
he lacks justiﬁcation to form a belief one way or the other about whether
or not he has justiﬁcation to believe this (Jp & JJp & JJp).
Now, Goldman is faced with a dilemma. If it is possible to stipulate a
case of justiﬁed agnosticism, then Goldman’s position delivers a counter-
intuitive verdict on the case and he is thereby confronted with an episte-
mic version of Moore’s paradox. Goldman must therefore deny that it is
possible to stipulate any such case of justiﬁed agnosticism. In other
words, he is committed to a ban on justiﬁed agnosticism, which says that
if one lacks justiﬁcation to believe that one has justiﬁcation to believe
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that p, then one has justiﬁcation to believe that one lacks justiﬁcation to
believe that p (JJp ﬁ JJp). In that case, however, his attempt to res-
cue an externalist version of reliabilism collapses into a form of internal-
ism. If we contrapose negative infallibility (Jp ﬁ JJp) and the ban
on justiﬁed agnosticism (JJp ﬁ JJp), then we can derive positive
self-intimation (Jp ﬁ JJp). Similarly, if we contrapose positive infalli-
bility (Jp ﬁ JJp), then from the ban on justiﬁed agnosticism (JJp
ﬁ JJp), we can derive negative self-intimation (Jp ﬁ JJp).
To sum up, if Goldman denies the ban on justiﬁed agnosticism, then
his weak form of reliabilism generates counterintuitive verdicts in cases
of justiﬁed agnosticism and confronts him with an epistemic version of
Moore’s paradox. In that case, his position is unmotivated, since it
faces all the same problems as strong reliabilism, which it was designed
to avoid. On the other hand, if he accepts the ban on justiﬁed agnosti-
cism, then he must either reject the infallibility thesis, in which case his
position collapses into strong reliabilism, or he must accept the self-
intimation thesis, in which case it collapses into internalism. Either
way, Goldman’s weak reliabilism fails to locate a stable and well moti-
vated intermediate position between internalism on the one hand and
strong reliabilism on the other.
Strong and weak reliabilism are certainly not the only options avail-
able for proponents of an externalist theory of justiﬁcation.21 Neverthe-
less, the arguments of this paper have more general repercussions, since
they establish that any externalist theory is faced with an epistemic ver-
sion of Moore’s paradox. The more general moral to be drawn from
this paper is that the epistemic version of Moore’s paradox cannot be
avoided except by taking on an internalist commitment to the accessi-
bility of justiﬁcation.
6. Explaining Accessibility
I want to conclude by raising a question that emerges from the argu-
ments of this paper, which requires a more extended discussion else-
where. The main aim of this paper has been to argue for the
accessibility of justiﬁcation on the grounds that it is indispensable for
solving an epistemic version of Moore’s paradox. However, it is one
thing to argue that justiﬁcation is accessible, but it is another thing to
explain what makes it the case that justiﬁcation is accessible. If justiﬁca-
tion is accessible, then part of the job description for a theory of justiﬁ-
cation is to give an account of the determinants of justiﬁcation, which
explains why justiﬁcation is accessible.
21 For a range of other externalist options, see Bergmann (2006), Goldman (1993),
Sosa (2007), and Williamson (2000).
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After all, epistemic facts about which propositions one has justiﬁca-
tion to believe are not brute facts. They supervene on non-epistemic
facts in the sense that there cannot be epistemic diﬀerences between sit-
uations unless there are some non-epistemic diﬀerences between them.
Moreover, they are determined by non-epistemic facts in the sense that
there cannot be epistemic diﬀerences between situations unless they are
explained by corresponding non-epistemic diﬀerences between them.
The determinants of justiﬁcation, then, are the non-epistemic facts that
determine the epistemic facts about which propositions one has justiﬁ-
cation to believe.
One of the main tasks for a theory of justiﬁcation is to specify the
determinants of justiﬁcation. According to reliabilism, for instance, the
determinants of justiﬁcation are non-epistemic facts about the reliabil-
ity of one’s doxastic processes. However, the accessibility of justiﬁca-
tion imposes substantial constraints on an account of the determinants
of justiﬁcation, since justiﬁcation is accessible only if the determinants
of justiﬁcation are themselves accessible. For instance, facts about the
reliability of one’s doxastic mechanisms are not accessible in the sense
that one has justiﬁcation to believe that they are reliable if and only if
they are in fact reliable. So, if justiﬁcation is accessible, then facts
about the reliability of one’s doxastic mechanisms cannot be among
the determinants of justiﬁcation. But then what are the determinants of
justiﬁcation? Which facts, if any, are accessible in the sense that one
has justiﬁcation to believe that they obtain if and only if they obtain?
Here is a sketch of an answer, which I develop in more detail else-
where.22 The determinants of justiﬁcation are non-epistemic facts about
one’s mental states, which are introspectively accessible in the sense
that one has introspective justiﬁcation to believe that those mental facts
obtain if and only if they obtain. The argument for this claim is by
inference to the best (indeed, the only) explanation. If the determinants
of justiﬁcation are introspectively accessible mental states and if the
determination relation is accessible by a priori reﬂection, then the facts
about which propositions one has justiﬁcation to believe are accessible
by means of a combination of introspection and a priori reﬂection. If
not, then it is quite obscure what else could explain the accessibility of
justiﬁcation. Therefore, the accessibility of justiﬁcation provides the
basis of an argument for a version of mentalism, on which the determi-
nants of justiﬁcation are facts about one’s introspectively accessible
mental states. Of course, it is a further question which of one’s mental
states are introspectively accessible in the relevant sense.
22 See Smithies (forthcoming, c).
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According to John McDowell (1995) and Timothy Williamson
(2000: Ch.9), the determinants of justiﬁcation include factive mental
states, such as seeing that p, hearing that p and remembering that p,
which are determinate ways of knowing that p. However, these factive
mental states are not introspectively accessible in the sense that one has
introspective justiﬁcation to believe that those mental states obtain if
and only if they obtain. For instance, it is implausible to suppose that
one has introspective justiﬁcation to believe that one sees that p if and
only if one sees that p. One might argue that if one sees that p, then
one has introspective justiﬁcation to believe that one sees that p. But
suppose one suﬀers an illusion or hallucination in which one does not
see that p, but merely seems to see that p. It seems incredible to sup-
pose that, in such a case, one has introspective justiﬁcation to believe
that one does not see that p, but merely seems to see that p. After all,
this would be to deprive skeptical scenarios of their intuitive power.
But if factive mental states are not introspectively accessible, then
according to the line of argument sketched above, they cannot be
among the determinants of justiﬁcation.
Various philosophers, including Conee and Feldman (2001) and
Ralph Wedgwood (2002), have argued for a non-factive version of
mentalism on which one’s non-factive mental states determine which
propositions one has justiﬁcation to believe. However, these philoso-
phers have eschewed any commitment to the accessibility of justiﬁca-
tion. Nevertheless, if the accessibility of justiﬁcation can be
independently motivated by the kinds of arguments given in this paper,
then it provides the basis for a new and perhaps even more compelling
line of argument for a non-factive version of mentalism. The argument,
in brief, is that justiﬁcation is accessible only if it is determined by
one’s non-factive mental states.
This paper began with a rough characterization of internalism as the
thesis that one has a special kind of epistemic access to facts about
which propositions one has justiﬁcation to believe. Following Alex By-
rne (2005), however, we can distinguish the claim that one’s epistemic
access is privileged, in the sense that it is better than other modes of
epistemic access, from the claim that it is peculiar, in the sense that it is
diﬀerent from other modes of epistemic access. My main aim in this
paper has been to argue that our epistemic access to facts about justiﬁ-
cation is privileged in the sense that it is infallible and self-intimating.
In this section, however, I have suggested that our epistemic access is
peculiar in the sense that it has its source in our introspective access to
the mental states that are the determinants of justiﬁcation. Moreover, I
have suggested that our privileged access to facts about justiﬁcation is
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best explained by the hypothesis that it is peculiar in just this way. I
hope to develop this suggestion in more detail elsewhere.23
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